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ANASTASOFF, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, AND 
FEDERAL APPELLATE JUSTICE 
CARL TOBIAS* 
In Anastasoff v. United States,1 a three-judge panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently 
invalidated the court's local rule of appellate procedure 
providing that "unpublished opinions are not precedent and 
parties generally should not cite them."2 Eighth Circuit Judge 
Richard S. Arnold authored the opinion, holding that this local 
requirement violates Article ill of the United States 
Constitution. Regardless of whether the provocative decision in 
Anastasoff is constitutionally sound, the opinion trenchantly 
emphasizes the critical significance of a public policy issue that 
has remained essentially untreated for too long. 
Judge Arnold's Anastasoff opinion perceptively identifies the 
substantial complications created by burgeoning caseloads and 
the static resources available to resolve these appeals. It 
cogently admonishes that the federal judicial system is in 
serious difficulty if the volume of appellate filings and 
temporal restraints preclude the circuit bench from attributing 
precedential value to each case. Judge Arnold concomitantly 
rejects the proposition that deficient resources prevent judges 
from according all appeals precedential effect. He also 
repudiates the notion that appellate courts are currently 
developing an underground corpus of law that applies only to 
the litigants in a particular case. Instead, he argues that there 
must be sufficient resources to address mounting caseloads 
adequately, and if these funds are unavailable, every judge · 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas. I wish to thank Jay Bybee, Michael Higdon, Bruce Markell, and Peggy 
Sanner for valuable suggestions; Angeline Garbett and Mike Gillooly for 
processing the piece; and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. 
1. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on reh'g en bane, 235 F.3d 1054 
(8th Cir. 2000). 
2 81H CIR. R. 28A(i). A more recent Ninth Circuit opinion upholds that court's 
similar rule, see 91H CIR. R. 36-3, and rejects Anastasoff. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 
F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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must devote the requisite time to treat each of the filings 
competently, even if backlogs increase. 
The three-judge panel, thus, threw down the constitutional 
gauntlet by invalidating the Eighth Circuit local rule while 
most other appellate courts continue to enforce analogous 
provisions. Evaluating the threat to the delivery of appellate 
justice posed by these local requirements as discussed in the 
Anastasoff opinion, however, is more important. This Comment 
also seeks to explore the most promising solutions to that 
pressing legal and public policy problem. 
Part I of this Comment, therefore, traces the problem of a 
historical growth in caseloads without a corresponding rise in 
resources as addressed by the Eighth Circuit decision. Part II 
evaluates the Anastasoffholding and its implications. Increasing 
appeals, scarce resources, and the restrictions imposed by 
procedures like the Eighth Circuit local rule may well 
jeopardize modern appellate justice, as Judge Arnold's opinion 
eloquently demonstrates. Part Ill then presents 
recommendations for addressing this situation. It analyzes 
remedies that might solve or at least ameliorate these problems 
at the appellate level, principally through reductions in the 
volume of cases that attorneys and parties consider filing and, 
should this possibility prove deficient, measures that would 
respond directly to those appeals actually pursued in a prompt, 
inexpensive, and fair manner. 
I. How CASELOAD GROWTH AND SCARCE REsOURCES 
ERODED DELIVERY OF APPELLATE JUSTICE 
The problem of expanding appellate caseloads, scarce 
resources, and increased reliance on unpublished opinions has 
received thorough examination by legal scholars.3 The quantity 
of appeals from federal district court decisions has increased 
3. See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF 
THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 14-51, 106-50 (1994); COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: FINAL REPORT 13-28 (1998) 
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, 
Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 71, 75-79 (2001); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, 
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 273, 274-97 (1996); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal 
Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REV. 189, 192-96 (1997). 
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steadily since the 1970s.4 Congress has partially addressed this 
expansion by committing more resources to the federal 
appellate judiciary, but its effort has been insufficient and may 
have even imposed various disadvantages. For instance, 
lawmakers have authorized additional active appellate court 
judgeships, but the number of new judicial positions has 
apparently failed to keep pace with exponential docket growth 
and might have actually contributed to the erosion of judicial 
collegiality and consistent decisionmaking. Congress has 
simultaneously enlarged the courts' administrative staff and 
their responsibilities, although this expansion may have 
aggravated the bureaucratic nature of the appellate justice 
system.5 
The responses to caseload growth with scarce resources have 
also varied among the regional circuits. 6 Practically all 
appellate courts have limited the procedures they accord 
appeals, especially by screening them in terms of their 
perceived significance and difficulty. For example, courts have 
granted oral arguments in a declining percentage of appeals, 
and the parties that do secure them frequently have less time to 
argue.7 The appellate courts have also promulgated local rules 
governing opinion publication and citation identical or 
analogous to the Eighth Circuit provision invalidated by the 
Anastasoff panel. These prescriptions typically authorize three-
judge panels or their individual members to designate certain 
decisions as unpublished, thus limiting their precedential 
effect.8 
4. See, e.g., JUDITii A. McKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTiiER ALTERNATIVES FOR 
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 17-35 (1993); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 13-17; Carol Krafka, Civil Caseload Trends in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in 
COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 127, 127-144 (1998) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]. 
5. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-25, 30-37; Michael 
Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1603-04 (2000); Richman 
& Reynolds, supra note 3, at 286-97; infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
6. See, e.g., McKENNA, supra note 4, at 41-43; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 21-27; Krafka, supra note 4, at 132-33; see also Carl Tobias, A Federal Appellate 
System for the Twenty-First Century, 74 WASH. L. REv. 275, 278 (1999). 
7. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 34; 5TH CIR. R. 34; 11TH CIR. R. 34. See generally BAKER, 
supra note 3, at 108-17; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 22, Table 2-6; 
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 103-06 (1998); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 
3, at 279-81. 
8. See, e.g., 6TH CIR. R. 36; 9TH CIR. R. 36; see also BAKER, supra note 3, at 119-35; 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 22, Table 2-7; WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, 
at 110-13; Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAc. & 
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Escalating appellate court caseloads, the static resources 
available for treating them, and the circuit bench's responses to 
those considerations have had detrimental consequences for 
lawyers, litigants, judges, and appellate justice. Most 
important, the judiciary' s curtailment of procedural 
opportunities has significantly limited the expeditious, 
economical, or equitable disposition of appeals. Only in a 
dwindling percentage of cases is there comprehensive 
resolution on the merits after full briefing and oral argument 
before a panel of three circuit judges,9 thereby restricting the 
visibility and accountability of the appellate bench.10 This 
phenomenon decreases the ability of litigants to present their 
views thoroughly before the bench and to clarify matters that 
their briefs might not address. Reduced publication limits 
judges' responsibilities to justify their substantive 
determination and may erode public confidence in appellate 
decisionmaking. 
II. ANALYSIS OF TiiE ANASTASOFF OPINION 
In Anastasoff, the appellant asserted "precisely the same legal 
argument" that the Eighth Circuit had rejected eight years 
earlier in Christie v. United States.11 The appellant contended, 
however, that the earlier ruling did not bind the three-judge 
panel because Christie was unpublished and, therefore, not a 
precedent under Eighth Circuit local appellate rule 28A(i), 
providing that "unpublished opinions are not precedent and 
PROC. 219 (1999); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 177 (1999); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 3, at 75-79. 
9. See, e.g., MCKENNA, supra note 4, at 42-49. For analyses of appellate justice, 
see BAKER, supra note 3, at 14-30; MCKENNA, supra note 4, at 9-11. 
10. According to Judge Posner: 
[D]enying oral argument when there are lawyers on both sides [of a case] 
... tend[s] to diminish the quality of the judicial consideration .... [You 
cannot] ask the lawyers questions and you [lack] a period of focused 
concentration on that case. (W]hen an opinion is published under the 
name of a judge, it enforces a certain responsibility of consideration on 
the judge. The worst type of disposition ... just says, affirmed .... [T]hen 
the danger of an error of having overlooked something because you did 
not reason it out on paper is significant. 
Considering Judicial Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation of 
Judgeships in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Hearing Before 
the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts 10-11 Oune 
28, 1998) (statement of Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Richard Posner). See generally 
BAKER, supra note 3, at 108-21. 
11. No. 91-2375 MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam). 
No. 3] Unpublished Opinions and Federal Appellate Justice 1175 
parties generally should not cite them."12 Yet the Anastasoff 
panel rejected this argument, holding that "the portion of Rule 
28A(i) that strips the precedential weight of unpublished 
opinions is unconstitutional under Article ill, as it purports to 
confer on the federal courts a power that extends beyond the 
'judicial.'"13 
In the second part of the decision, Judge Arnold supported 
the panel's substantive holding with a comprehensive 
historical exegesis on the doctrine of precedent. The jurist 
proclaimed that the concept was "well established" by the time 
of the Constitutional Convention. He also demonstrated that in 
the eighteenth century the judge's obligation to honor 
precedent emanated from the fundamental character of the 
judicial power, and that Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, 
as well as the Anti-Federalists "assumed that federal judicial 
decisions would become authorities in subsequent cases."14 
In short, the doctrine of precedent was "well-established in 
legal practice, regarded as an immemorial custom," and 
"valued for its role in past struggles for liberty."15 The duty of 
federal courts to follow previous opinions, meanwhile, "was 
understood to derive from the nature of the judicial power 
itself and the need to prevent it from creating a dangerous 
union with legislative authority."16 Judge Arnold, thus, 
concluded "that, as the Framers intended, the doctrine of 
precedent limits the 'judicial power' delegated to the courts in 
12. 81H CIR. R. 28A(i). 
13. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot 
on reh 'gen bane, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). But see Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 
1155, 1159-69 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding the Ninth Circuit's similar Rule 36-3 and 
describing the reasons for its constitutionality). For an earlier rendition of several 
ideas that Judge Arnold subsequently included in the Anastasofl opinion, see 
Arnold, supra note 8, at 226. 
14. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900-03 (citations omitted). But see Hart, at 1162-69; 
Recent Case, Anastasoff v. United States, 114 HARV. L. REv. 940, 943 (2001). For 
analyses of the founders' views of precedent, see Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in 
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 V AND. L. 
REv. 647, 662-66 (1999); Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the 
Founding, 42 B.C. L. REv. 81 (2000). 
15. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903. 
16. Id. But see Hart, 266 F.3d at 1162-69 (disputing "that the Framers viewed 
~ecedent in the rigid form that we view it todaV''); Lee, supra note 14, at 660 n.64 During the latter half of the seventeenth and during the eighteenth centuries we d cases constantly followed in practice but a tendency to assert that they were 
not binding in theory."). See generally Arnold, supra note 8, at 226 (considering the 
constitutioiiality of forbidding citation to unpublished opinions). 
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Article III."17 
In this section of his decision, Judge Arnold also explained 
what the case did not involve. The question Anastasojf presented 
was not whether appellate courts should publish opinions, 
"but whether [unpublished opinions] ought to have 
precedential effect."18 He carefully observed that 
'"unpublished' in this context has never meant 'secret"' and 
that all of the opinions and orders rendered by every federal 
appellate court in the United States are available to members of 
the public.19 
Judge Arnold then considered a more practical point. 
"Members of the federal appellate bench," he wrote, frequently 
observe that the "volume of appeals is so high that it is simply 
unrealistic to ascribe precedential value to every decision."20 In 
essence, he intimated that judges lack sufficient "time to do a 
decent enough job . . . to justify treating every opinion as a 
precedent."21 The panel remarked that, "[i]f this is true, the 
judicial system is indeed in serious trouble, but the remedy is 
not to create an underground body of law good for one place 
and time only."22 The court then contended that the 
appropriate approach is to "create enough judgeships to 
handle the volume, or, if that is not practical, for each judge to 
take enough time to do a competent job with each case. If this 
means that backlogs will grow, the price must still be paid."23 
Judge Arnold further explained that local appellate strictures 
like Rule 28A(i) "assert that [appeals] courts have the power" 
to choose which opinions to follow and a number of local 
provisos even proscribe citation to unpublished decisions. Yet, 
wrote Arnold, this perspective "exceeds the judicial power, 
17. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903. But see Hart, 266 F.3d at 1160-69; Recent Case, 
supra note 14, at 943-44. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIFS ON TIIE 
CONSTITUTION OF TIIE UNITED STATF.S §§ 377-78 (1833). 
18. Anastasojf, 223 F.3d at 904. "Indeed, most appellate courts now make their 
opinions, whether labeled 'published' or not, available to anyone online." Id. 
19. Id. See generally Arnold, supra note 8, at 219-20 (describing the origins of 
unpublished opinions and the difference between unpublished and published 
opinions). 
20. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904. 
21. Id. See also supra notes 3-6, 8 and accompanying text. 
22 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904. 
23. Id. Accord Richman & Reynolds, supra note 3; see also supra notes 4-5 and 
accompanying text. 
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which is based on reason, notfiat."24 
For purposes of clarification, the three-judge panel 
emphasized that the court was not "creating some rigid 
doctrine of eternal adherence to precedents," expressly 
acknowledged that opinions could and sometimes should be 
overruled, and stated that "this function can be performed by 
the en bane Court, but not by a single panel."25 Judge Arnold 
observed that the appeals court has the authority to change 
precedents "[i]f the reasoning of a case is exposed as faulty, or 
if other exigent circumstances justify it," although the appe:µate 
judiciary has the responsibility to substantiate this modification 
by explicitly recognizing the precedent from which the appeals 
court is departing and by clearly and convincingly articulating 
the reasons why it has chosen to disavow the earlier 
precedent.26 "In this way, the law grows and changes, but it 
does so incrementally, in response to the dictates of reason, and 
not because judges have simply changed their minds."27 
The fourth section of Judge Arnold's opinion summarizes the 
panel's decision. Judge Arnold reiterates that "[f]ederal courts, 
in adopting rules, are not free to extend the judicial power of 
the United States described in Article ill ... [which power] is 
limited by the doctrine of precedent."28 Anastasoff argues that 
local strictures such as Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i) permit 
"courts to ignore this limit" and to depart from the law in 
"prior decisions without any reason to differentiate the cases," 
an exercise of discretion the panel found to contravene directly 
the traditional understanding of precedent.29 This local Eighth 
Circuit requirement, thus, enlarged the judicial power beyond 
its Article ill authority by empowering the appellate bench to 
decide what opinions would bind it and, insofar as Rule 28A(i) 
purported to circumscribe the precedential effect of earlier 
decisions, the provision was unconstitutional. 
In the panel's thorough enunciation of the historical and 
legal rationales for finding local appeals court provisos like 
24. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904. But see Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159-74. 
25. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1170-74, generally agrees with 
the views expressed in this Paragraph. 
26. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d. at 904-05. 
27. Id. at 905. 
28. Id. (citation omitted). 
29. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905. But see Hart, 266 F.3d at 1163-74 (presenting a 
different view of the traditional role of precedent). 
1178 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 25 
Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i) unconstitutional, the Anastasojf 
opinion raises complex and arcane issues of constitutional 
history, theory, and law. The ruling involves complicated 
questions about the meaning of the judicial power in Article m 
and precedent in the federal system. Regardless of how the 
federal judiciary and constitutional scholars ultimately resolve 
these issues, the public policy concern about how appellate 
courts can best address increasing cases with static resources 
will have salience. Definitively resolving the constitutionality 
of provisions like Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i)30 is not necessary 
to a consideration of the important practical concerns. Even if 
the three-judge panel deciding Anastasoff erroneously deemed 
the local Eighth Circuit requirement unconstitutional, the 
problem created by mounting dockets and limited resources 
remains, and it can only become more acute in the future. 
Ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Appellate courts have confronted escalating appeals with 
scarce resources. They have responded to caseload growth by 
generally restricting procedural opportunities and by 
specifically promulgating local publication rules identical or 
similar to the Eighth Circuit provisos invalidated in Anastasojf 
and upheld in Hart. The growth in the number of appeals is 
unlikely to abate, while the available resources will probably 
not expand. Given this predicament, the appellate courts can, 
thus, invoke two principal courses of action for addressing 
docket increases. First, lawmakers might institute approaches 
limiting the quantity of appeals parties could pursue and, if 
this proved inadequate, they could authorize appellate courts 
to employ measures that directly treat the rising cases in a 
prompt, inexpensive, and fair fashion causing minimal 
interference with appeals court operations. 
30. For discussions of these constitutional issues, several of which criticize the 
views in Anastasoff, see Hart, 366 F.3d at 1163-74; Lee, supra note 14; Price, supra 
note 14; Recent Case, supra note 14; see also Merritt & Brudney, supra note 3, at 
118-21 (reporting certain empirical results that support the Anastasoff ruling). See 
also Daniel B. Levin, Note, Fairness and Precedent: Anastasoff v. United States, 110 
YALE L. J. 1295, 1300 (2001) (criticizing the Anastasoff rule because it would 
disadvantage resource-poor litigants). 
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A. Limiting the Number of Appeals 
The classic way to reduce the volume of appellate filings 
would be to curtail the extensive civil and criminal jurisdiction 
of federal district courts. Two commissioners of the five-
member Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, which recently completed a comprehensive 
appellate court study, addressed the civil side of this approach 
by urging lawmakers to restrict diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction.31 Nonetheless, certain observers of the federal 
judicial and legislative branches doubt that the legislature will 
circumscribe jurisdiction generally or diversity specifically.32 
Over the last decade, Congress apparently federalized less 
criminal conduct than it had during the 1980s, created fewer 
new civil causes of action than Congress had during the prior 
two decades,33 and restricted some civil jurisdiction.34 
Lawmakers did, however, pass a significant number of less 
important criminal statutes and general crime legislation 
between 1990 and 2000,35 while adopting several 
comprehensive civil enactments .36 
31. Circuit Judge Gilbert Merritt, whom Justice Byron White joined, urged retention 
of this jurisdiction only when parties "show a concrete need for a fedeial forum ... 
because of (1) the existence of local influence that threatens prejudice to an out-of-state 
litigant, or (2) the complex nature of interstate litigatio;n." See COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 3, at 77-88. For evaluations of analogous ideas, see JUDIOAL 
CONFERENCE OF 1HE U.S., LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR 1HE FEDERAL COURTS 134 (1995) 
[hereinafter LoNG RANGE PLAN]; McKENNA, supra note 4, at141-53. 
32 See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, The Donahue Lecture Series: Administering Justice 
in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 29, 34-37 (1990); Kathleen F. Brickey, 
Criminal Mischief. The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 
1135 (1995). 
33. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 
(1972); Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) 
(codified in scattered sections of 7 & 16 U.S.C. (1994)); (Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §1501 (1994)); Major Fraud Act, Pub. L. No. 100-700, 102 
Stat 4631 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, & 41 U.S.C. (1994)). 
34. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-32, 110 Stat 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C. (Supp. II 
1996)); Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat 1321-66 
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C. (1994)); Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1996)). See generally Carl Tobias, Common 
Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REv. 699, 702-17 (1995) (describing 
proposed procedural reforms in civil justice). 
35. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 102-322, 108 Stat 796 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of the United States 
Code). 
36. See, e.g., Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
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Additional measures to restrict appeals appear equally 
infeasible or ineffective. For instance, the Commission decided 
not to recommend that Congress make appellate jurisdiction 
discretionary in all cases. Discretionary review contravenes the 
accepted notion that a losing litigant should have one 
opportunity to convince an appeals court that the trial judge 
committed prejudicial error. The Commission did expressly 
admit that the procedural limitations analyzed in Anastasojf 
and Hart have blurred the difference between mandatory and 
discretionary review.37 Another possibility would be to expand 
the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, but the improvement would likely be 
negligible because the entire appellate system would be 
addressing the same number of appeals.38 
B. Treating Appeals Directly 
One additional approach would be the prompt, economical, 
and equitable judicial treatment of those cases that litigants do 
pursue. A clear, if rather controversial, solution would be to 
increase staff support or authorize additional circuit 
judgeships. For example, the steady growth in appellate 
caseloads prompted the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, the policymaking arm of the federal courts, to request 
that Congress approve new members for numerous appeals 
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§12101-213 (1994)). Congress 
will probably not cabin jurisdiction because many lawmakers capitalize on the 
basically cost-free political advantages realized by federalizing new fields of 
criminal activity and by recognizing more civil causes of action. The Supreme 
Court might narrow jurisdiction with the abstention or justiciability doctrines, but 
this could prevent resolution on the merits and would minimally decrease 
appeals' quantity, even were the approach less troubling. See Paul D. Carrington, 
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and 
the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 544 (1969); Martha Dragich, Once a Century: 
Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 16-17. 
37. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 70-72. For analyses of the relevant 
history, see BAKER, supra note 3, at 234-38; Dragich, supra note 36, at 52-54; Tobias, 
supra note 3, at 238-39. 
38. The Commission assessed major reasons to centralize review of social 
security and tax cases in the Federal Circuit, but designated no new types of 
appeals Congress might usefully assign it. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 72-74. Because the Federal Circuit may lack special expertise in these two areas, 
this approach might not facilitate efficiency, offer systemic economies, or be fairer 
to litigants. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Comments to the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998), available at http:// 
app.comm.uscourts.gov /report/ comments/DOJ.html [hereinafter Comments]; 
see also BAKER, supra note 3, at 222-27 (analyzing other ways to reduce appeals); 
Tobias, supra note 3, at 234-35 (analyzing even more ways to reduce appeals). 
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courts during the 1990s.39 
Although enlarging the number of administrative employees 
and their duties or creating more appellate court judgeships 
might expedite case review, both alternatives could have 
detrimental effects. Increasing extra-judicial support or staff 
obligations might create additional bureaucratic obstacles and 
correspondingly reduce circuit judges' visibility and 
accountability.40 The possibility of expanding the relatively 
large federal judiciary has contributed to the dispute over 
splitting the Ninth Circuit. Enlarging the bench might also 
reduce efficiency and magnify some complications identified 
by the Commission, such as deficient communications. Finally, 
expansion could engender staunch opposition from many 
judges, even if the Senate and the President could guarantee 
prompt confirmations for the newly established positions.41 
A less problematic, more feasible approach would be to fill 
the current appeals and district court judicial vacancies. At 
various junctures during the 1990s, several circuits, (most 
prominently the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth), 
functioned without a number of the active appeals court judges 
authorized by Congress.42 This situation required a few 
39. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Overview, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 2001, at 1; see 
also S. 3071, 106th Cong. (2000). But see CHARLFS E. GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATE 
JUDICTARY SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHf & nm COURTS, 
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON nm APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN nm 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS, Executive Summary {1999). 
40. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRrsIS AND REFORM 26-
28 {1985); CHRISTOPHER E. SMTIH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND 
COURT ADMINISTRATION 95-124 (1995); see also supra note 5 and accompanying 
text For analyses of these increases and their disadvantages, see McKENNA, supra 
note 4, at 49-54; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 23-25. 
41. See Gordon Bermant, Jeffrey A. Hennemuth & A. Fletcher Mangum, Judicial 
Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 Mrss. COL. L. 
REY. 319 (1994); Dragich, supra note 36, at 45-49; Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial 
Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L. J. 527 (1998). New positions 
may afford few long-term benefits and only be a stopgap that worsens some 
problems, namely inadequate intracircuit uniformity and collegiality, which can 
attend the administration of large courts and implicate circuit-splitting. See, e.g., 
BAKER, supra note 3, at 202; Tobias, supra note 3, at 235; Carl Tobias, The 
Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L. J. 1357, 1388-89 (1995); see also 
WILLIAM P. MCLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CAsELOADS 107 (1984) (describing 
how more judges may not yield permanent improvement); S. 346, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (prescribing a Ninth Circuit split). 
42 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 30; Carl Tobias, The Judicial 
Vacancy Conundrum in the Ninth Circuit, 63 BROOK. L. REY. 1283 (1997); Shirley M. 
Hufstedler, Comments fo the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals (Oct 23, 1998); Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, 
Comments to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
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appellate courts, such as the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, to cancel 
oral arguments, thereby imposing unwarranted cost and delay, 
and to rely substantially on judges apart from their own active 
members when assembling three-judge panels.43 In fact, 
approximately one-third of the panels terminating cases after 
oral argument nationwide during the 1997 fiscal year included 
at least one participant who was not an active judge of the 
court, with the Eleventh Circuit employing visitors at a rate 
nearly double the national average.44 Too great dependence on 
visiting judges can have negative effects, including more 
expensive or slower dispute resolution. One possible solution 
would be to ensure that courts have available every authorized 
active circuit judge to hear cases. For example, if the Ninth 
Circuit could function with all twenty-eight active members, it 
might be able to render decisions more promptly. To fill open 
appeals court judgeships, the President should carefully 
consult senators before formally nominating candidates, and 
senators should cooperate closely with the President in 
confirming judges for openings.45 Even if every appeals court 
were working with its total judicial contingent, however, the 
appellate judiciary might lack enough resources to resolve 
mounting caseloads as expeditiously, inexpensively, and 
equitably as is desirable. 
An additional direct, but controversial, way of addressing 
docket growth would be to further restrict the procedural 
options of those filing appeals. For instance, appellate courts 
could further decrease the declining percentage of cases 
accorded a comprehensive treatment, including oral arguments 
and published opinions. This approach would help resolve 
appeals quickly and cheaply, although it may threaten fairness, 
undermine visibility and accountability, and diminish public 
Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998). 
43. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Appellate Openings on the Ninth Circuit, 
19 REV. LmG. 233 (2000); Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 
1997, at37. 
44. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 7, at 108, Table 6a. For assessments of 
appeals courts' reliance on visiting judges, see BAKER, supra note 3, at 198-201. 
45. White House and Senate political party control are now reversed; however, 
President Bush has realized little more success than President Clinton in 
appointing judges. There are currently more than 90 vacancies and over 50 
pending nominations. Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary (April 19, 2002), at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htm; see also Sheldon Goldman & 
Elliot Slotnick, Introduction: Clinton's Judicial Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 227 (2001). 
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acceptance of appellate determinations.46 
Other measures that directly respond to increasing dockets 
seem impractical or ineffective, principally because of the 
possible detrimental side effects. For example, certain 
alternatives to dispute resolution, such as arbitration,47 and 
panels of two rather than three circuit judges,48 would foster 
the prompt, economical resolution of more appeals. Yet 
reducing the number of judges that review a case can 
jeopardize equitable decisionmaking and erode the visibility 
and accountability of the appellate court bench.49 Judges might 
also capitalize on case management techniques such as those 
used by the Ninth Circuit, which applies special screening 
panels to resolve appeals with truncated processes and 
employs greater "batching" of cases that involve analogous 
issues or similar legislation, thereby expediting disposition.50 
Although these types of actions could yield efficiencies, the 
remaining advantages that courts can derive from procedural 
modifications nevertheless appear relatively minute. 
In short, the legislative and judicial branches should 
carefully scrutinize and consider applying approaches to 
reduce the number of appeals. Failing that, they should directly 
treat in a prompt, inexpensive, and fair manner those cases 
46. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
47. See, e.g., JAMES B. EAGLIN, THE PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN 
TiiE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: AN EVALUATION (1990). For assessments of 
alternatives to dispute resolution, see BAKER, supra note 3, at 136-47; Tobias, supra 
note 3, at 230. 
48. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 31, at 131-32; MCl<ENNA, supra note 4, at 
127-33. For analyses of these panels, see COMMI5.SION REPoRT, supra note 3, at 62-66; 
Dragich, supra note 36, at 58-62 
49. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Seven chief judges criticized the 
Commission idea for District Court Appellate Panels, saying that it rested on the 
"flawed premise that cases are easily divisible into two categories," error 
correction and law declaration, and would add another level of review for most 
cases, which would be "expensive to litigants and unacceptable." The idea would 
burden the judiciary, collld require more "district judgeships for appellate 
furposes, which does not seem to be good public policy; and would provoke 
'virtually monolithic opposition by district judges." Harry Edwards et al., 
Comments to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals (Nov. 10, 1998), available at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/ 
comments/Becker.htm. Accord Comments, supra note 38. 
50. See NIN1H CIRCUIT EVALUATION COMM., INTERIM REPORT 17 (Mar. 2000); 
Procter Hug, Jr., Responding to Ninth Circuit Concerns: The Innovative Work of 
the Evaluation Committee (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
See generally Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Preferable Approach for the Ninth 
Circuit, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1657 (2000) (describing techniques used to facilitate the 
disposition of cases in the Ninth Circuit). 
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actually brought. Such measures, however, may have limited 
feasibility or efficacy. Further, appellate courts seem to have 
exhausted the benefits they can extract from such procedural 
reforms as refined screening and related management 
techniques. Because the problem of docket growth may now 
resist definitive resolution and could even be intractable, there 
may be little value in applying these ideas. Instead, the federal 
judiciary might need to forge a consensus on the best means of 
addressing caseload expansion. For example, judges could 
undertake a finely-calibrated assessment of current and 
projected docket magnitude as well as the resources available 
to combat growing appeals while evaluating how effectively 
courts deliver appellate justice. If resources for deciding cases 
are inadequate to provide sufficient justice, the solution may be 
to increase the number of judgeships or extra-judicial 
personnel. Members of the bench must first reach greater 
accord, however, about the best remedies to combat increasing 
appeals with relatively static resources. Until then, the problem 
could well remain unresolved and perhaps worsen. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit recently found 
unconstitutional a local appellate rule stating that 
"unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally 
should not cite them." Despite the validity of the constitutional 
holding in Anastasoff, the decision elucidates and accentuates 
the critical issue of rising caseloads in the face of scarce 
resources to decide them. Judge Arnold astutely observes that 
appellate courts will be in serious difficulty if this situation 
prevents judges from ascribing all appeals precedential effect. 
After Judge Arnold provides a compelling critique of this 
notion, he recommends devoting adequate resources to 
caseload resolution and, should this prove infeasible, 
admonishes that his colleagues commit sufficient time to 
address each appeal competently, even if backlogs accumulate. 
The federal legislative and judicial branches must heed 
Anastasoff's warning by redoubling their efforts to resolve the 
complications presented by docket increases and limited 
resources, because these problems will grow and promise to 
continue eroding appellate justice. 
